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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

EMINENT DOMAIN -

V.ALOE

AS FIXED BY

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES - WHEN IS PROPERTY TAK.EN FOR.
PURPOSE OF DETERMINING PAYMENT OF INTEREST? - Defendant's land,
situated between the riverside and set-back levees of the proposed floodway
extending along the western bank of the Mississippi from Bird's Point to New
Madrid, Missouri, was inundated in the flood of 1937, at which time the
fioodway, with its system of fuse plugs ( whereby the riverbank levee was to be
lowered to allow flood waters to spend their destructive force by spreading over
large: areas) was not yet in operation. Thereafter the United States, under
authority conferred by the Flood Control Act of 1928,1 instituted condemnation
proceedings to secure :fiowage rights over defendant's land. Defendant claimed
that the amount of compensation due had been set by an agreement entered
into with the War Department in l 932 2 and that he should be allowed interest
thereon from the date that his land was taken, which he alleged to be at the
time that the Flood Control Act of 1928 was passed, or in the alternative,
either the time that construction was begun on the set-back levee (October 21,
1929) or the time it was completed (October 31, 1932). Held, the amount
of compensation to be paid was that agreed upon between defendant and the
War Department, and interest was not allowable thereon as there had been no
taking at any of the dates alleged by defendant. Danforth, v. United States,
308 U. S. 271, 60 S. Ct. 231 (1939).
When the power of eminent domain is given to private corporations, an
attempt to purchase from the owner is generally made a condition precedent to
condemnation proceedings.3 In contrast to this, it is said that a governmental
agency is unable to purchase by agreement and is limited to the process of
condemnation, absent statute, because of the public interest in having the amount
of compensation determilied in a judicial proceeding.4 If a private corporation
takes possession under an agreement to purchase, it cannot repudiate that agreement by subsequent condemnation proceedings.5 An action for damages 8 or
45 Stat. L. 534, 33 U. S. C. (1934), §§ 7oza-7ozm.
Defendant accepted an offer contained in a letter from the secretary of war
written in accordance with authority conferred by 45 Stat. L. 534, § 4, 33 U. S. C.
(1934), § 702d: "When the owner of any land, easement or right-of-way shall fix
a price for the same which, in the opinion of the Secretary of War is reasonable, he may
purchase the same at such price. • • ."
B RANDOLPH, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 124 (1894).
4 "The determination of the amount of compensation is in the nature of a judicial
proceeding, and where the amount is to be paid for by the public, the public, as a party
in interest, have a right to that proceeding." Hanlon v. Supervisors of Westchester, 57
Barb. (N. Y.) 383 at 394 (1870); Village of Hyde Park v. Spencer, u8 Ill. 446, 8
N. E. 846 (1886); z LEWIS, EMINENT DOMAIN, 3d ed., § 463 (1909). There would
seem to be no objection to the legislature's wa~ving this public interest in judicial
proceedings.
11 Gray v. Burlington & M. R.R.,. 37 Iowa II9 (1873); RANDOLPH, EMIHENT
DoMAIN, § nS (1894).
,
6 Morss v. Boston 8c Me. R.R., z Cush. (Mass.) 536 (1848); MtLLS, EMINENT
DoMAtN, zd ed., § n3 (1888).
1
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for specific performance is open to the party aggrieved by breach of the contract.1
I£ a governmental agency is empowered by statute to purchase or condemn at
its discretion, there would seem to be no valid reason for applying a rule differing from that applicable to a private company exercising the same power; in
either case the agreement should be binding upon the parties. This is recognized by the holding in the principal case.8 The formula for compensation in
condemnation proceedings is simple: "just compensation" must be made under
the requirements of the Fifth Amendment as applied to the federal government 9
and the same requirement is placed upon the states by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.10 This constitutional requirement of just compensation is construed to require payment of interest from the time of taking until
the payment of the award.11 Though the rule is settled that interest should be
allowed from the time of taking until the time of payment, the question remains,
when is there a taking? Actual physical possession is universally recognized as
a taking sufficient to start interest running upon the unpaid award.12 Short
of an actual change of possession courts have held that talcing, for the purpose
of determining interest, occurs at the commencement of suit,18 at the time
1 Viele v. Troy & Boston R. R., 20 N. Y. 184 (1859); MILLS, EMINENT DoMAIN, 2d ed.,§ II3 (1888). The English rule is settled that when a private company,
empowered to condemn, gives notice to treat and the parties thereafter agree upon a
price, the resulting contract is specifically enforceable. See Regent's Canal Co. v. Ware,
23 Beav. 575, 53 Eng. Rep. 226 (1857); CRIPPS, CoMPENSATioN, 8th ed., 57-60
(1938).
8
For another discussion of this part of the principal case, see 8 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 859 (1940).
9
" • • • nor shall private property be t.aken for public use, without just compensation." U. S. Constitution, Amendment 5. See United States v. Jones, 109 U. S.
513, 3 S. Ct. 346 (1883); NicHoLS, EMINENT Do.MAIN, § 259 (1909) [1 ibid.,
2d ed., § 204 (1917 ].
10
"Since the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution is binding on
every state, this requirement determines the minimmn. basis of compensation throughout the entire United States." ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER. THE LAw OF EMINENT
DoMAIN 17-18 (1936). See Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112,
17 S. Ct. 56 {1896); 2 LEWIS, EMINENT DoMAIN, 3d ed., § 811 (1909).
11 Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 54 S. Ct. 26 (1933); Seaboard Air
Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299, 43 S. Ct. 354 (1923); United States v.
Rogers, 255 U. S. 163, 41 S. Ct. 281 (1921); NICHOLS, EMINENT DoMAtN, § 285
(1909) [1 ibid., 2d ed., § 216 (1917)]; 2 LEWIS, EMINENT DoMAIN, 3d ed., § 742
(1909); OR.GEL, VALUATION UNDER. THE LAw oF EMINENT DoMAIN, § 5, note 20
(1936); 96 A. L. R. 18 at 150 (1935). See McCormick, "The Measure of Compensation in Eminent Domain," 17 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1933). In England the
law of vendor-purchaser governs the allowance of interest between the date of the
award and the time of payment. See Regent's Canal Co. v. Ware, 23 Beav. 575, 53
Eng. Rep. 226 (1857); CRIPPS, Co.MPENSATloN, 8th ed., 210-213 (1938).
12 See United States cases cited in previous note; NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN,
§ 286 (1909) [1 ibid., 2d ed., § 216 (1917)].
18
Brown v. United States, 263 U. S. 78, 44 S. Ct. 92 (1923). This case
adopted the statutory rule of Idaho which had been followed by the lower federal
courts under the conformity statute.
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when the report of commissioners valuing the property is .filed or con.firmed,14
at the time title passes,15 at the time when the land owner is entitled to compensation and demands it.16 Theoretically the ideal solution would be to have
the passage of title, change of possession, and payment occur simultaneously, but
as a practical matter this is impossible due to delay in legal proceedings.17 So
title may pass by decree, yet the owner may remain in possession pending appeal.
In such a situation interest has been refused on the ground that the owner
enjoys the benefits of possession, a rough equivalent to interest.18 But this possession is a limited one of doubtful value in that the landowner is precluded from
putting permanent improvements on the land or from selling it except subject to
the condemnation proceedings. Moved by these considerations, other courts
have allowed interest from the time that the suit was begun, the award was
con.firmed, or the title passed, deducting therefrom the value of the rents and
profits.19 Essential fairness would seem to demand that landowners receive interest before the actual change in possession; whether this should begin at the
commencement of suit, the confirmation of the award, or the passage of title,
is a question of policy to be determined by balancing the interests of the landowner against the interests of the public. The decision in the principal case
seems acceptable; on none of the alleged dates was there a strict taking. An
argument that the value of defendant's possession was reduced by the passage
of the Flood Control Act, for which reduction he should be compensated, ignores
the public interest involved.20 The construction of the set-back levee did not add
14 "· • • and we think that, generally, it is necessary, to allow interest from the
date of the award, to give the owner just compensation." "\Varren v. First Division of
St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 2I Minn. 424 at 427 (1875). This view was adopted as the
fair one in a federal case involving land in Minnesota. United States v. Sargent,
(C. C. A. 8th, x908) 162 F. 81. Cf. Brown v. United States, 263 1). S. 78, 44
S. Ct. 9z (x9z3). See also United States v. Engeman, (D. C. N. Y. 1891) 46 F. 898.
15 Fink v. City of Newark, 40 N. ,J. L. II (1878).
16 Barnes v. City of New York, 27 Hun (N. Y.) z36 (r88z), decision probably
influenced by desire to protect governmental agency from adverse claimants, each insisting upon the right to compensation.
.
17 "The true rule ,vould be, as in the case of other purchases, that the price is due
and ought to be paid at the moment the purchase is made, when credit is not specially
agreed on. And if a pie-powder court would be called on the instant and on the spot,
the true rule of justice for the public would be, to pay the compensation with one
hand, whilst they apply the axe with the other; and this rule is departed from only
because some time is necessary, by the forms of law, to conduct the inquiry; and this
delay must be compensated by interest." Parks v. Boston, l 5 Pick. (32 Mass.) x98
(1834).
18 Shoemaker v. United States, x47 U. S. 28z, 13 S. Ct. 361 (r89z); Bauman
Y. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 17 S. Ct. 966 (1897); Hamersley v. City of New York,
56 N. Y. 533 (1874). See 2 LEWIS, EMINENT DoMAIN, 3d ed., § 742 (1909).
19 Brown v. United States, 263 U. S. 78, 44 S. Ct. 92 (x923); United States
v. Sargent, (C. C. A. 8th, x908) 162 F. Sr; Warren v. First Division of St. Paul
& Pacific R. R., 21 Minn. 424 (1875); Fink v. City of Newark, 40 N. J. L. I I
(1878); 2 LEWIS, EMINENT DOMAIN, 3a ed., § 742 (1909); °RANDOLPH, EMINENT
DOMAIN, § 280 (1894).
2 ~ "The mere enactment of legislation which authorizes condemnation of property

RECENT DECISIONS

materially to the burden upon defendant's land since the fl.oodway was not yet
in operation and the riverbank levee had not been lowered.
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cannot be a taking. Such legislation may be repealed or modified, or appropriations may
fail.'' Principal case, 308 U. S. at 286. Cf. United States v. Sponenbarg~, 308 U. S.
256, 60 S. Ct. 225 (1939); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548; 17 S. Ct. 966 (1897).

